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JURISDICTION
This Court has "original jurisdiction over the question of state law"
certified by the United States District Court for the District of Utah. Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2-2(l)(2001).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Judge Tena Campbell of the United States District Court for the District of
Utah certified the following question of law:
Whether a federal government employee, who ordinarily
would be immune from suit in cases of strict liability, may be
liable under Utah's Dramshop Act if the Plaintiffs establish
negligence.
(Appellant's Addendum at tab 2.)
The Millers submit that the question certified requires this Court to answer
the following two questions of Utah law:
1.

Whether the common law of Utah recognizes a right of action by a

third party against a seller of alcoholic beverages, who is not subject to the
provisions of Utah's Dramshop Act, when the third party has suffered injury at
the hands of an intoxicated person and where the seller negligently continued to
serve the intoxicated person in violation of Utah's statutory prohibition.
2.

Whether, provided there is a such a third-party common law cause of

action against negligent sellers of alcoholic beverages, who are not subject to the

1

provisions of Utah's Dramshop Act, Utah's Dramshop Act preempt such causes of
action.
RELEVANT STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he
is a party.
UTAH CONST., Art. I, § 11.

All laws of a general nature shall have uniform operation.
UTAH CONST., Art. I, § 24.

A copy of this statute was attached at addendum tab 1 of
Appellant's Opening Brief
Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14-101 (1999 Repl.)

2

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The U.S. is attempting to avoid responsibility for its negligent and wrongful
acts by exploiting what it perceives as a loophole in interaction between the law of
Utah and the law of the United States. Utah common law currently recognizes a
third-party action against negligent vendor's of alcohol, although there is some
dispute concerning the exact nature of this common law right. This Court should
resolve any conflict in favor of the laws and policies of Utah.
At common law an negligence action accrues against another, when one
suffers an injury, which is proximately caused by the breach of a duty by another.
The U.S. had a duty not to serve alcohol to an already intoxicated man, which
existed because one could foresee the likelihood of injury and because serving an
intoxicated person is against the law. The U.S. Government breached this duty
and the Millers were injured as a result. The question of legal or proximate cause
amounts to whether the result was foreseeable and whether it was a substantial
factor in causing the harm. The Millers injuries were substantially caused by the
U.S. Government's failure to stop serving an intoxicated man alcohol. The
Millers' claims all elements of claims for common law negligence, and this Court
should recognize the Millers' common law claims.
This Court has stated that Utah's Dram Shop Act preempts the common
law of negligence insofar as it imposes liability for acts the Act reaches; however
the common law is not preempted as to the U.S. Government because the Act does

3

not reach the acts of the government in buying and selling alcohol. This is
because the Act imposes strict liability and federal law prohibits applying strict
liability to the U.S. Government. Further, the Act does not preempt the common
law as it applies to the U.S. Government, because the legislature did not intent to
apply the Act to the U.S. Government. Finally, the Act does not preempt the
common law as the U.S. Government, because such an interpretation of the Act
would be unconstitutional under the Utah Constitution.
Application of the common law to third-party tort claims, for acts not
reached by the Act, is consistent with the previous rulings of this court, the intent
of the legislature in enacting the Act, the public policy of the State of Utah, the
jurisprudence of several sister states, the well established policy of the courts of
Utah and the open courts provision of the Utah Constitution. Accordingly, this
Court should answer the certified question in the affirmative and hold that a
federal government employee, who ordinarily would be immune from suit in cases
of strict liability, may be liable under the principles of common law, under Utah's
Dramshop Act, if the plaintiffs establish negligence.

4

ARGUMENT AND CITATION TO AUTHORITY
The U.S. Government is attempting to avoid responsibility for its negligent
and wrongful acts, arguing that the U.S. Government is immune from liability for
the wrongful and negligent acts and omissions of its employee by operation of the
Federal Tort Claims Act in relation to the strict liability imposed by Utah's
Dramshop Act, Utah Code Ann. 32A-14-101 (1999 RepL).
Under Utah law a vendor who negligently and wrongfully provides alcohol
to another may be liable to a third-party for injuries suffered as a result of the
vendor's negligent and wrongful provision of alcohol. S!ee Rees v. Albertson's,
Inc., 587 P.2d 130 (Utah 1978); Utah Code Ann. §32A-14-101 (1999 RepL). This
Court has explicitly recognized that a cause of action accrues to "a third person
against a vendor of alcohol who sells the same negligently and in violation of a
statute to an underage purchaser, who becomes intoxicated and causes injury to
the third person." MacKav v. 7-Eleven Sales Corp.. 2000 UT 15, ^[9, 995 P.2d
1233. See also Rees v. Albertson's, Inc.; Yost v. State, 640 P.2d 1044 (Utah
1981). Conversely, this Court has stated that "there is no common law basis to
support a third-party negligence claim against" vendors of alcohol. Adkins v.
Uncle Bart's, Inc., 2000 UT 14, ^20, 1 P.3d 528, 533, cert denied, 531 U.S. 1011
(2000). This Court should resolve this seeming conflict in a manner that promotes
the public policy and law of the State of Utah1 and recognize that a vendor who

1

See Utah Code Ann. §68-3-2 (1953).
5

negligently and wrongfully serves alcohol to an intoxicated person, who the
vendor knew or should have known was intoxicated, may be liable to a third
person for injuries suffered as a result of the vendor's negligent and wrongful acts.
I.

COMMON LAW LIABILITY TO A THIRD-PARTY FOR
NEGLIGENT PROVISION OF ALCOHOL TO ANOTHER
As a general rule, "at common law, one who suffers injury to his person or

property because of the negligence of another has a right of action in tort." Payne
v. Myers , 743 P.2d 186, 188 (Utah 1987)(citation omitted). "Under traditional
tort analysis, the plaintiff must establish the existence of a duty, the breach of
which proximately causes injury to the plaintiff." Id. See Restatement (Second)
of Torts §281 (1965). Thus, under the traditional principles of common law, a
right of action in tort accrues to the Millers against the U.S. Government, if 1) the
U.S. Government employee had a duty to discontinue serving alcohol to Mr.
Valle, when the U.S. Government employee knew or should have known Mr.
Valle was intoxicated and 2) the U.S. Government employee's continued service
of alcohol to an already inebriated Mr. Valle proximately caused the Millers'
injuries. Furtheri, "questions relating to negligence and proximate cause are
generally for the trier of fact... to determine." Rees, atl33. "When there is a
doubt about the existence of proximate cause and negligence, it should be resolved
by allowing the case to go to trial." MacKay, at ]fl2, 1236 (citing Rees).
A.

The U.S. Government Had A Duty To Stop Serving Alcohol To Mr.
Valle After He Became Intoxicated.

6

Under common law principles, a duty exists if the Court determines that "as
a matter of law, the tort-feasor could have anticipated the harm to the plaintiff."
Loveland v. Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 778 (Utah (Durham, J.
dissenting)(citing Rest. 2d Torts § 281 comment c (1965)). In addition, a duty
may be created by legislative enactment, which modifies the common law. See
Jackson v. Mateus, 2003 UT 18121,70 P.3d 78, 83 ("It is a well-recognized
principle that the common law may be modified by statute or ordinance."). In this
case the U.S. Government had a duty to stop serving Mr. Valle after he became
intoxicated, both because the harm to the Millers was a foreseeable result of
serving alcohol to an intoxicated person and because, under Utah law, a duty
exists to not serve alcohol to intoxicated persons in bars and clubs.
1.

A duty to discontinue serving alcohol to already
intoxicated patrons existed because the resulting harm
was foreseeable.

In determining whether or not a duty exists, "Utah follows the
foreseeability rule set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Torts and followed by
a majority of states." Tallman v. City of Hurricane, 1999 UT 55,5J7, 985 P.2d
892, 894. In order for a duty to exist under this formulation of reasonable
foreseeability, it must "be reasonably foreseeable, not that the particular accident

7

would occur, but only that there is a likelihood of an occurrence of the same
general nature." Regs, at 133.2 See also
Here, the likelihood that the intoxicated patron of the U.S. Government's
on-base N.C.O. Club would be involved in an automobile accident after he left the
base was reasonably foreseeable. Accordingly, the U.S. Government had a duty,
under common law principles to stop serving Mr. Valle after he became
intoxicated.
2.

A duty to discontinue serving already intoxicated
patrons existed under Utah law.

It is well-recognized "that the common law may be modified by statute or
ordinance." Jackson v. Mateus, 2003 UT 18 121, 70 P.3d 78, 83. Laws,
ordinances and regulations provide a model of expected behavior, and may be
adopted as the standard of care, provided that "the purpose of the statute was to
protect a class of persons of which" the injured party is a member from the type of
harm which resulted. Rollins v. Peterson, 813 P.2d 1156 (Utah 1991) (applying
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 286, § 288 (1965)). Although, violation of the
standard of care established by statute or regulation does not raise to the level of
negligence per se until the standard if formally adopted by the court, "violation of
2

Recently, the Connecticut Supreme Court addressed the issue of foreseeability in
relation a third-party action for negligent and wreckless infliction of emotional
distress: "It seems self-evident that the serving of alcoholic beverages to an
obviously intoxicated person by one who knows or reasonably should know that
such intoxicated person intends to operate a motor vehicle creates a reasonably
foreseeable risk of injury to those on the roadways." Craig v. Driscoll 813 A.2d
1001, 1020 (Conn. 2002)
8

a standard of safety set by statute or ordinance is prima facie evidence of
negligence." Id., fh 4.
Title 32A of the Utah Code, Utah's Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, was
enacted under the State's police powers to further public "health, peace, safety and
morals." Utah Code Ann. § 32A-1-103 (1999 Repl.) (Title 32A enacted to protect
"health, peace, safety, welfare, and morals" of Utah citizens.). It includes
provisions for both civil liability3 and criminal liability4, for providing alcoholic
beverages to persons who appear to be intoxicated.5 The U.S. Government
employee of the Air Force NCO Club violated this standard of care and conduct
by continuing to serve Mr. Valle after he was obviously intoxicated. Accordingly,
the US Government's violation of the strictures of the Act is evidence of that it
breached its duties to the Millers.
Further, following this reasoning, this Court should adopt the standards of
Utah's Alcoholic Beverage Control Act as duty owed by providers of alcohol in
this State, consistent with § 286 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, thereby
establishing a violation of the provisions of the Act as negligence per se. It is
3

Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14-101 (1999 Repl.).
"A person man not sell, offer to sell, or otherwise furnish or supply any alcoholic
beverage or product to any person who is apparently under the influence of
intoxicating alcoholic beverages or products or drugs or to a person whom the
person furnishing the alcoholic beverage knew or should have know from the
circumstances was under the influence of intoxicating alcoholic beverages or
products or drugs." Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-204 (1999 Repl.).
5
"Any person who violates this title or the commission rules adopted under this
title is guilty of a class B misdemeanor, unless otherwise provided in this title."
Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-104 (1999 Repl.).
9
4

obvious that furnishing alcohol to an intoxicated person - a person deemed by law
to lack the judgment to drink responsibly - poses a threat to public safety, and the
Act unquestionably reflects a legislative concern for the dangers attendant to (or
inherent in) the sale of alcohol. Utah's Alcoholic Beverage control Act exists to
protect Mr. and Mrs. Miller -members of the public—from the type of injuries
that they sustained, in the manner that they sustained them, to wit, an auto accident
caused by an intoxicated driver who had been negligently and wrongfully
provided alcohol after he was visibly and obviously intoxicated.
The U.S. Government has a duty in common sense, under the common law
principle of reasonable foreseeability and pursuant to Utah statutory law not to
serve customers in its bar and clubs after those customers become intoxicated.
B.

The U.S. Government's Negligent Serving Of Alcohol To An
Obviously Intoxicated Patron Was The Proximate Cause Of The
Millers9 Injuries.
In the common law, a negligent or wrongful act is the proximate cause

when it is the act that "necessarily sets in operation the factors that accomplish the
injury." Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 439 (Utah 1996). "To establish
proximate cause" a plaintiff must prove that the conduct complained of "was a
substantial causative factor leading to his injury." McCorvev v. Utah State Dept.
of Transp., 868 P.2d 41, 45 (Utah 1993). As a general rule, "proximate cause is
and issue for the jury to decide." Id. Only when reasonable minds can draw only
one inference from the evidence presented does proximate cause become a
10

question of law to be determined by the Court. See Rees, 587 P.2d at 133;
Harline, at 439.
1.

Traditional rule

Traditionally, at common law, third-party claims against one who
negligently furnishes liquor for damages caused by the person intoxicated by the
liquor were barred. Yost 1047, fn 2. The reasons advanced for this prohibition
were that the drinking of the alcohol was a subsequent intervening cause, which
was the proximate cause of the injury, and that "the later injury to another was
thought to be an unforeseeable result of providing the liquor." Ono v. Applegate,
612 P.2d 533, 537 (Haw. 1980). These common law rationales are dated, based in
an age of horses and carriages and not the fast-paced age we live in where an
"imbiber going upon the public highways" is "capable of producing mass death
and destruction." Meade v. Freeman, 462 P.2d 54 (1969).
It is axiomatic that automobile accidents are the foreseeable result of
intoxicated driving. With the risks raising to the level of common knowldege, the
assumption that the ingestion of the alcohol is a sufficient intervening force to
obviate all liability of the one providing the alcohol is counter to accepted
common law principles in which a "tortious act by a third party does not act as an
intervening force if such acts are within the scope of the risk created." Craig v.
Driscoll 813 A.2d 1001, 1017 (Conn. 2002). Indeed, this Court has recognized

11

that by improperly providing alcohol to another one may proximately cause injury
to a third-person. See Rees, at 133; Yost at 1047; MacKav, at ^[12, 1246.
The hazards and the awareness of the age have made archaic the old
common law rule of third-party liability.
2.

Evolution of The Traditional Rule

The general rule that a common law negligence action could not be brought
by a third-party against the person who provided alcohol to another began in the
middle of the last century. In 1959, New Jersey Supreme Court held that a third
party injured by an intoxicated person could bring a negligence action against the
commercial vendor who sold the inebriate the alcohol. Rappaport v. Nichols, 156
A.2d 1 (N.J. 1959). Since Rappaport, most courts have abandoned the old
common law rule as being "antiquated and illogical." Brigance v. Velvet Dove
Restaurant, Inc., 725 P.2d 300, 302 (Okl 1986).6 Additionally, many states that
already had enacted the dramshop acts, including Utah, have recognized a new
common law right of action against commercial vendors and have permitted

6

See Nazareno v. Urie. 638 P.2d 671 (Alaska 1981); Ontiveros v. Borak. 557 P.2d
200 (Ariz. 1983); Ono v. Applegate. 612 P.2d 533 (Haw. 1980);MichnikZilberman v. Gordon's Liquor. Inc., 453 N.E.2d 430 (Mass. 1983); Campbell v.
Carpenter. 566 P.2d 893 (Or. 1977); Jardine v. Upper Derby Lodge No. 1973. Inc..
198 A.2d 550 (Pa. 1964); Sorensen v. Jarvis. 350 N.W.2d 108 (Wis. 1984);
Pfieifer v. Copper stone Restaurant and Lounge. 693 P.2d 644 (Or. App. 1985);
Veselv v. Sager. 486 P.2d 151 (Calif. 1971); Deeds v. U.S.. 306 F.Supp. 348 (D.
Mont. 1969).
12

plaintiffs to recover in negligence, even where their claim would be barred by the
Dramshop Act provisions.7
Two decision, made over twenty years apart by court on far sides of this
country epitomize the thoughtful evolution of the common law of third-party
liability mandated by changing circumstances, Ono v. Applegate, 612 P.2d 533,
decided in 1980 by the Supreme Court of Hawaii, and Craig v. Driscoll 813 A.2d
1003, decided in 2002 by the Supreme Court of Connecticut.
In Ono, the plaintiff was woman who was injured when the automobile
driven by a man who had been intoxicated before going to a tavern, where he
continued to drink, crossed the middle of the road and struck the auto in which she
was a passenger head-on, killing two of the occupants and seriously the plaintiff.
The defendant tavern's motion to dismiss was denied, and the defendant appealed
the apportionment of fault. At issue on appeal was the question, "whether a
person who in injured by an inebriated automobile driver may recover, in the
absence of dram shop legislation, from the tavern that provided alcohol to the
driver in violation of [Hawaii's] liquor control law." Id. at 537.

7

See Mullis v. Monroe. 505 S.E.2d 131 (N.C. 1998); Largo Corp. v. Crespin. 727
P.2d 1098 (Colo. 1986); Connolly v. Conlon. 371 N.W.2d 832 (Iowa 1985); Thaut
v. Finlev. 213 N.W.2d 820 (Mich. 1973); Trail v. Christian. 213 N.W.2d 618
(Minn. 1973); Berkeley v. Park. 262 N.Y.S.2d 290 (1965); Hutchens v. Hankins.
303 S.E.2d 584 (N.C. 1983); Mason v. Roberts. 294 N.E.2d 884 (Ohio 1973);
Tomlinson v. Love's Country Stores. Inc.. 854 P.2d 910 (Okla. 1993); Brigance v.
Velvet Dove Restaurant. Inc.. 725 P.2d 300, 302-03 (Okla. 1986).
13

The court examined the reasoning of Vesely v. Sager, 486 P.2d 151 (Calif.
1971), wherein the California Supreme Court stated "that the consumption of
liquor, the resulting intoxication, and the injury-producing conduct were
foreseeable intervening causes which would not relieve the tavern of liability. Id.
(citing Vesely at 159). Noting with approval the reasoning in Vesely and the clear
trend in "[o]ther jurisdictions, that in the absence or inapplicability of dram shop
legislation" had allowed recovery against taverns "for injuries received by a third
person as a result of a customer's intoxication," the Ono court was persuaded that
"a person injured by an inebriated tavern customer" should be permitted recovery
at common law, provided the plaintiff proves negligence. Id. at 538.
In defining the common law duty of the tavern, the court, employing the
standard set for in the Restatement (Second) of Torts, determined that the liquor
control act imposed a duty on the tavern "not to serve a person under the influence
of alcohol." Id. at 539. On the issue of proximate cause, the court a held that "in
light of the universal use of automobiles and the increasing frequency of accidents
involving drunk drivers," a tavern owner should reasonably foresee "the
consequences of serving liquor;" thus, "the consumption, resulting inebriation and
injurious conduct are therefore foreseeable intervening acts which will not relieve
the tavern of liability. " Id at 538-39.
Similar Ono, the issue in this case is whether to allow common law
recovery for negligently providing liquor to an intoxicated person, in violation of
14

Utah's Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, in the absence of Dramshop liability. As
in Ono, the U.S. Government N.C.O. Club had a duty to not serve intoxicated
patrons. Under the reasoning Ono, the U.S. Government should reasonable
foresee that persons who become intoxicated at the N.C.O. Club are likely to be
involved auto accidents, like the one that seriously injured the Millers and that it is
the breach of the duty is a proximate cause of resulting automobile accidents.
In Craig v. Driscoll the Connecticut court dealt with the issue of whether,
notwithstanding Connecticut's Dram Shop Act, the common law recognizes
negligent infliction of emotional distress claims against a purveyor of alcoholic
beverages made by the mother and brother of a pedestrian who was run down by
the intoxicated patron of the purveyor's establishment. 813 A.2d at 1006. The
Craig court undertook a thorough analysis of preemption by the Dram Shop Act,
the common law, the effect of the Act upon the common law and strength of the
reasoning behind extant proximate cause jurisprudence. Id. Making way for the
common law cause of action outside the Act's consideration, the court expressly
rejected the "fiction that the behavior of anyone who is under the influence of
alcohol is automatically, as a matter of law, an intentional intervening act that
relieves the liability of a vendor of alcohol even though the vendor's negligence is
otherwise established." Id. at 1022.
Similarly, this Court should further embrace the notion that, whether or not
the person under the influence is a minor, the behavior of an intoxicated person is
15

not of necessity an intervening cause of injury to a third person, when a purveyor
of alcohol continues to serve alcohol to the intoxicated person
The U.S. negligently and wrongfully continued to serve alcohol to an
obviously and visibly intoxicated Arthur Valle. The intoxicated Mr. Valle then
left the Club and drove his vehicle onto the roads of Utah where he collided with
the Millers' vehicle, severely and permanently injuring the Millers. This accident
was the foreseeable result of the intoxication enabled and caused by the negligent
over-serving by the U.S. Under traditional common law principles, the U.S. is
liable to the Millers', insofar as the Millers' injuries were caused by its negligent
acts or omissions. The Millers' claim of negligence against the U.S. and the facts
of this case satisfy all elements of claims for common law negligence and
negligent infliction of emotional distress, and this Court should recognize the
Millers' common law claims.
II.

THE COMMON LAW LIABILITY OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT IS
NOT PREEMPTED BY UTAH'S DRAMSHOP ACT.
In Gilger v. Hernandez, this Court explored the extent of preemption of the

common law by Utah's Dramshop Act. 2000 UT 23, 997 P.2d 305. The Court
explained the relationship between common law liability and limited Dramshop
liability as a trade-off, whereby
[T]he legislature assured those who were subjected to
dramshop liability that they would not be subject to common
law negligence liability and that this statutory liability would
be limited, something that exposure to common law
negligence liability would not have provided.
16

Id., at ^} 13, 310. The Court concluded, "that the common law of negligence is
preempted insofar as it may impose liability for acts that the Dramshop Act
reaches'' Id (emphasis added). This holding gives rise to the logical inference
that common law liability is not preempted for acts that are not reached by Utah's
Dramshop Act, where no trade-off between limited liability and common law
liabililty took place.
The Utah's Dramshop Act does reach the acts U.S. Government or its
employees in procuring and selling alcoholic beverages. The U.S. Government is
not liable under the Utah's Dramshop Act through the operation of the Federal
Tort Claims Act, and there was no trade-off between the protections of the Act and
the common law. Moreover, the Utah legislature did not intend for Utah's
Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, including Dramshop, to apply to the U.S.
Govemmenet. Accordingly, Utah's Dramshop Act does not preempt the common
law liability of the U.S. Government.
A. Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, Utah's Dramshop Act Does Not
Reach Acts Of U.S. Government Employees.
Under the doctrine of federal preemption and through the operation of the
Federal Tort Claims Act, Utah's Dramshop Act does not reach the acts of the U.S.
Government U.S. Government. If the United States' assertion is correct, Utah's
Dramshop Act creates a regime of strict but limited liability for those who violate
its provisions; however, the through the operation of federal preemption and the
Federal Tort Claims Act, the provision and liability of the Act do not reach the
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acts of U.S. Government employee. Accordingly, the common law of negligence,
as to the U.S. Government, is not preempted by the Dramshop Act8.
1.

Strict Liability of Utah's Dramshop Act

This Court has held that Utah's Dramshop Act imposes a form of strict
liability. Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 111, 117 (Utah 1991). Notwithstanding the
allocation of comparative fault, under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37(2), the Act still
"prescribes a form of strict liability." Red Flame, Inc. v. Martinez, 2000 UT at
^[11. See also Adkins v. Uncle Bart's. Accordingly, Utah's Dramshop Act is a
strict liability statute,
2.

Liability of the U.S. Government Under the FTCA

The Federal Tort Claims Act waives the governmental immunity of the
U.S. Government for claims for money damages "for injury or loss of property, or
personal injury or death" when that injury or loss of property is "caused by the
negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employees of the Government"
acting in the scope and course of employment, "if a private person, would be liable
to the claimant" under "the law of the place where the act or omission occurred."
28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1). The United States Supreme Court has determined that the
FTCA's broad waiver of immunity does "not authorize the imposition of strict
8

Of course, if there was no common law liability for serving liquor to a clearly
intoxicated individual, there would be nothing for the Dramshop Act to preempt.
Such is a clear recognition by the Mackay Court that there is common law
negligence for selling liquor to someone that is clearly intoxicated. See Mackay v.
7-Eleven Sales Corp., 995 P.2d 1233 (Utah 2000)(recognizing cause of action for
negligent sale of alcoholic beverages to a minor in violation of prescribed law).
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liability of any sort upon the Government." Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797, 804, 92
S.Ct. 1899, 1902 (1972) (restating rule announced in Dalehite v. United States,
346 U.S. 15, 73 S.Ct. 956(1953)).
Utah's Dramshop Act prescribes a form of strict liability. The U.S.
Government has denied any application of liability without fault. Thus, the Act
does not reach the acts of the U.S. Government. Since, the Act does not reach the
U.S, Government, no exchange of limited strict liability for the liability of the
common law could have taken place. Accordingly and because the Act does not
reach the acts of the U.S. Government and because there was no exchange of
common law liability for limited strict liability, the Act does not preempt the
common law as to the U.S. Government.
B.

The Utah Legislature Did Not Intent Utah's Dramshop Act To
Preempt The Common Law As To The U.S. Government.
Utah's Dramshop Act does not preempt common law liability of the actions

of the U.S. Government. Utah has adopted the preemption model developed by
the United States Supreme Court "for determining preemptive intent." Gilger v.
Hernandez, 2000 UT 23, f 11, 997 P.2d 305, 308.
Under this model, the Court first looks to find "language in the statute that
reveals explicit legislative to preempt common law. Id. If this explicit language
does not appear, the court considers "whether the statute's structure and purpose
or nonspecific statutory language, nonetheless reveal a clear, but implicit
preemptive intent." Id. This preemptive intent may become apparent a) when the
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statute "creates a scheme of statutory regulation so pervasive" that it is reasonable
to infer, "that the legislature left no room for the common law to supplement it,"
b) when the statutory law is "in irreconcilable conflict with the common law," or
c) when the common law stands "as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of the legislature." Id. at 308-09
(citing Barnett Bank of marion County v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25. 31. 116S.Q. 1103,
1104 (1996)(internal quotations and marks omitted).
Under this model analysis, it is clear that the Utah's Dramshop Act does not
preempt the common law as it may apply to the U.S. Government. The Act does
not expressly preempt the common law of liability. Nor do the statute's structure,
purpose and language reveal an intent to preempt the common law as it may apply
to the sale and distribution of alcohol by the U.S. Government. Instead, the
legislature left room for the common law to supplement the Act; there is no
conflict between the common law and the Act in this case; and here the common
law offers a means to more fully fulfill the purposes of the Act.
1.

Utah's Dramshop Act Does Not Expressly Preempt
The Common Law

Utah's Dramshop Act does not expressly preempt the common law of
liability for liquor distribution by the U.S. Government. See Utah Code Ann.
32A-14-101, et seq.; Id at ^ 12, 309. The Act does except the State, as well as its
agencies, employees and political subdivisions from any civil liability "arising out
of their activities in regulating, controlling, authorizing, or otherwise being
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involved in the sale or other distribution of alcoholic beverages." Utah Code Ann.
§ 32A-14-102 (1999 Repl). See Brinkerhoff v. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685
(1989)(holding that explicit language of Act precluded liability of employee of
State-owned NCO Club under the Act). However, the Act is notably silent as to
the liability of the U.S. Government. Thus, the question becomes whether the
statute's structure, purpose and language reveal an intent by the Legislature to
preempt the common law of liability as to the U.S. Government.
2.

The Structure And Language of Utah's Dramshop Act
Do Not Reveal An Intent To Apply Act To The U.S.
Government

The structure and language of the Act do not reveal an intent to preempt the
law of liability for the sale and distribution of alcohol by the U.S. Government.
While a[t]he Act evidences an overall scheme of regulation of liability for liquor
providers,"9 this scheme extends only to state-licensed providers of alcohol. In
fact, the structure and language of Title 32A indicates that the U.S. Government is
decidedly not considered or regulated by Utah's Dramshop Act.
Title 32A applies to "alcoholic beverage control in this state except where
local authorities are expressly granted regulatory control." Utah Code Ann. §
32A-1-102(3) (1990 Amd.). However, "local authority" is defined as "the
legislative body" of a county if unincorporated "or the governing body" of a city
or town if incorporated. Utah Code Ann. § 32A-1-105(25)(1990 Amd.). Notably,

9

Gilger, at 512, 309.
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even Title 32A's definition of "public building" does not include structures owned
or leased by the U.S. Government10, despite the existence of federal military
installations in Utah since before statehood and the relative comprehensiveness of
the regulatory scheme, there is no mention of application to the U.S. Government.
Further, the plain language of the Dramshop Act indicates a legislative
awareness and acceptance of remedies outside of the specific statutory remedies.
Subsection (4) does not expressly limit the type of remedy but provides that "[a]
person who suffers injury under Subsection (1) or (2) has a cause of action against
the person who provided the alcohol" Utah Code Ann. § 32A-14-101(4) (1999
Repl.). While Subsection (8) provides that "[njothing in this chapter precludes
any cause of action or additional recovery against the person causing the injury.
Id. Thus, while a cause of action does lie for persons, like the Millers, who are
injured as the result of a person providing alcohol in violation of the Act, the cause
of action is not of necessity at statutory cause of action, nor are other causes of
action precluded or preempted by the Act.
Construed liberally so as to effect the purpose of the Drampshop Act and to
further justice, the language and structure of Utah's Dramshop does not preempt
common law causes action, which impose liability upon the U.S. Government.

10

Utah Code Ann. § 32A-1-105(38)(1990 Amd.) defines a public building as "any
building or permanent structure owned or leased by the state, a county, or local
government entity that is used for public education, transacting public business, or
regularly conducting government activities."
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Supplementation By The Common Law
The permissive language in Subsections (4) and (8), combined with the lack
of any reference to the U.S. Government, which procures and distributes alcohol
in Utah, in both the Act and Title 32A as a whole, is evidence of legislative intent
to allow the common law to supplement statutory provisions of the Act. This
Court has already recognized that there is room to supplement the statutory
remedies provided by Utah's Dramshop Act for the negligent and improper
provision of alcohol with the common law. See Yost v. State; MacKay v. 7Eleven Sale Corp. Further, one must assume that the Legislature was aware that
the operation of the FTC A as interpreted by federal courts would preclude the
strict statutory liability imposed by the Act, when it did not include the actions of
the U.S. Government within the provisions of Title 32A. Thus, leaving the
common law to supplement the statutory provisions of the Act.
Conflict Between The Act And The Common Law
In this case there is no conflict between the common law and Utah's
Dramshop Act, insofar as the common law imposes liability on the U.S.
Government for the harm caused to the Millers by the negligence of its Federal
Employee, in continuing to serve Mr. Valle past the point where that Employee
knew or should have known Mr. Valle was intoxicated, when the Act (and the
Title that contains it) does not reach the acts of a U.S. Government bartender on a
military base within the State. Indeed, f,[i]t would be incongruous if in
circumstances where the state has cast its net wider than in a traditional negligence
23

action, a Government employee is automatically excused from liability even if his
negligence can be proved." Smith v. Pena, 621 F.2d 873, 880 (7th Cir. 1980).
The Common Law Is A Vehicle Vehicle For Furtherance
Of The Legislative Aims of the Act
Finally, in this case, the common law does not stand as a barrier to
effectuating the purposes and objectives of the legislature in enacting Utah's
Dramshop Act. The three basis purposes of dramhop legislation are punishment,
regulation and compensation. See Red Flame, Inc. v. Martinez, 2000 UT 22, f 16,
996 P.2d 540, 544 (Durham, J., dissenting); GUger, 2000 UT 23,1J29, 997 P.2d
305, 314 (Durham, J., dissenting). Applying the common law to the instant case
furthers all three of theses objectives, in a manner that the Act, by itself cannot.
Application of the common law to this case provides for punishment for the
U.S. Government's wrongful and negligent acts, in the form of financial
obligations to parties injured by those act. This financial disincentive for bad acts
acts as a regulatory force on care the U.S. Government exercises in serving
alcohol in the State. Finally, the application of the common law to the acts of the
U.S. Government provides compensation to persons injured as a result of its
negligent acts.
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C.

Constitutional Issues in Preemption Under The Open Courts
Provision of the Utah Constitution/
Further support for the assertion that the common law is not preempted by

Utah's Dramshop Act is found in an application of the strictures of the Open
Courts provision of Utah's Constitution, which provides:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done
to him in his person, property or reputation, shall have
remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered
without denial or unnecessary delay; and no person shall be
barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in
this State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he
is a party.
Article I, Section 11, Utah Const.
To determine if a statute unconstitutionally limits one's right to remedy by
due course of law for injury to one's "person, property, or reputation" under
Article I, section 11, we must apply the the two-part test first set forth in Berry v.
Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670, 683 (Utah 1985). Horton v. Goldminer's
Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah 1987), When reviewing statutes for
constitutionality, a statute is presumed constitutional, and the Court will''resolve
any reasonable doubts in favor of constitutionality." Society of Separations, Inc. v.
Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916, 920 (Utah 1993).
Under the Berry analysis, the Court must first determine "if the law
provides an injured person an effective and reasonable alternative remedy by due
course of law for vindication of his constitutional interest." Horton, at 1094. The
benefit provided by the substitute remedy "must be substantially equal in value or
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other benefit to the remedy abrogated .. . although the form of the substitute
remedy may be different." Id. If the law provides this substantially equal
substitute remedy, then the requirements of Section 11 are satisfied. Id. If,
however, "no substitute or alternative remedy provided," this abrogation is only
justified "if there is a clear social or economic evil to be eliminated and the
elimination of an existing legal remedy is not an arbitrary or unreasonable means
for achieving the objective." Id.
Here, if as the United States claims that the Millers are entitled to no
remedy under the Utah Dramshop Act, through preemption and operation of the
FTC A, then the Act, as applied,11 is unconstitutional under the Article I, Section
11. First, under the this theory, the Millers would be totally deprived of all
remedies, both statutory and common law, as the application of the interpretation
forwarded by the United States afford no effective and reasonable alternative
remedy. Second, no social or economic evil is eliminated. Indeed, the clear social
or economic evils to be eliminated was recognized by the Utah Legislature and
addressed with the enactment of Utah's Dramshop Act, and the interpretation of
Utah law forwarded by the United State perpetuates rather than eliminates those
evils. Accordingly, this interpretation and application of Utah law would be
unconstitutional.
11

It is unnecessary for this Court to determine whether Utah's Dramshop Act is
unconstitutional on is face. The Plaintiffs simply contend that it is
unconstitutional as applied to this case's unique factual setting as a result of the
application of the Federal Tort Claims Act.
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Under the foregoing analysis, the interpretation of Utah law forwarded by
the United States, wherein the Millers' common law remedies against the U.S.
Government are preempted by Utah's Dramshop Act and Utah's Dramshop Act,
as it applies to the U.S. Government, is preempted through operation of federal
law, is unconstitutional under the Open Courts provision of the Utah Constitution.
Accordingly, the common law as it applies to the U.S. Government is not
preempted.
D.

Equal Protection under the Utah Constitution.
The State of Utah's Constitution contains an Equal Protection Clause. Utah

Const. Art. I, § 24. That constitutional provision is not interpreted the same as the
Federal Constitution in every instance. Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Salt Lake
City Corp., 752 P.2d 884 (Utah 1988). Even when the rational basis test is
utilized, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that "to pass state constitutional
muster, a legislative measure must often meet a higher de facto standard of
reasonableness than would be imposed by the federal courts." Id. at 889. On the
other hand, when a fundamental liberty or suspect class12 is involved, the Utah
Supreme Court has implied that strict scrutiny would apply:
Although we have not expressly addressed the question under
the state constitution, at least one judge has indicated that a
strict scrutiny test would be appropriate under article I,
section 24.
See Allen v. Trueman, 110 P.2d 355, 365 (1941)(Wolfe, J., concurring).

io

The Plaintiffs do not contend that a suspect class is involved.
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In determining whether strict scrutiny should apply, the following
discussion by the Utah Supreme Court is enlightening as it pertains to fundamental
liberty under Utah law:
The protection of such basic personal interests from the
power of temporary majorities to infringe them is a primary
function of a constitution. Certainly, the right to the
protection of the law for one's person, property, and
reputation is a right that is as essential to the happiness of an
individual as is liberty. While democracy is the mainspring
of our republican form of government, the founders of this
state and this nation knew that certain basic rights could be
rooted in law more effectively than can be accomplished by
relying on the sometimes fickle goodwill of the popular
organs of government for their protection.
Horton, 785P.2dat 1091.
Horton involved a Utah statute that prevented a plaintiff from seeking
redress for personal injuries (the statute was declared unconstitutional under
Article I, section 11). The Millers respectfully ask this Court to consider the right
to redress wrongs in a civil action to be a fundamental right, equivalent to a
citizen's liberty in the eyes of the Utah Constitution. Strict scrutiny should be
applied to determine if the United States application of Utah's Dramshop Act is
constitutional.
Certainly, there would have been a less restrictive alternative available to
the legislature: such as stating in the Dramshop Act that if strict liability does not
apply to a defendant, negligence will. Thus, the State of Utah's policy of
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compensating victims of intoxicated individual's acts would be equally applied to
everyone.
While the strict scrutiny test is more rigorous than the rational basis test, the
Utah Dramshop Act, (if interpreted as argued by the US Government), does not
pass the rational basis test. There is no rational basis for passing an act that
disallowed recovery because the plaintiff was injured as a result of alcohol being
served on an Air Force base when recovery would be allowed had the alcohol been
served at a tavern a mile away off base. When applied under the government's
analysis, the act is clearly unconstitutional. Thus, no preemption is possible, and
Society of Separations, Inc., 870 P.2d at 920, requires that this Court resolve this
issue in a manner consistent with the Utah Constitution.
CONCLUSION
This Court should answer the certified question in the affirmative and hold
that a federal government employee, who ordinarily would be immune from suit in
cases of strict liability, may be liable under the principles of common law, under
Utah's Dramshop Act, if the plaintiffs establish negligence.
Application of the common law to third-party tort claims, for acts not
reached by the Act, is consistent with the interests of justice, the previous rulings
of this court, the intent of the Utah Legislature in enacting the Act, the public
policy of the State of Utah, the jurisprudence of several sister states, the well
established policy of the courts of Utah and the open courts provision of the Utah
29

Constitution. Accordingly, this Court should find that the common law of Utah
recognizes a right of action by a third party against a seller of alcoholic beverages,
who is not subject to the provisions of Utah's Dramshop Act, when the third party
has suffered injury at the hands of an intoxicated person and where the seller
negligently continued to serve the intoxicated person in violation of Utah's
statutory prohibition. This Court should further hold that Utah's Dramshop Act
does not preempt such causes of action.
SPENCE, MORIARITY & SHOCKEY, LLC

JUSTIN T. ASHWORTH
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees
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